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Abstract 
World class cities are few and far between, sometimes referred to as ‗global cities‘ or simply ‗world cities‘. 
There are no more than a dozen metropolitan areas in the world that can claim  this kind of global 
status. London,  New  York,  Paris,  and  Tokyo  sit  at  the  top  of  this  world  city  hierarchy. They  have  
enormous concentrations of economic, political, and cultural clout – measured by such things as the number of 
corporate headquarters, the size of their stock exchanges, the presence of national and international 
political bodies, and their role in music, fashion, and other cultural activities. What would it take to make a 
city claimed by two nations and central to three religions ―merely‖ a city, a place of difference and diversity 
in which contending ideas and citizenries can co-exist in benign yet creative ways? The intractable conflicts in 
the Middle East and the cycle of violence among Israelis and Palestinians are deeply embedded in historical 
struggles over national sovereignty and the right to territory. For this reason, questions about whose state will 
prevail in what physical location have defined the terms of conflict and negotiation. This also has meant that 
most proposed solutions to  ―the  Middle  East  problem‖  have  revolved  around  competing  claims  of  
nation-states,  their  rights  to existence, and their physical and juridically-sanctioned relationships to each 
other. While true generally, this framing of the problem has been especially dominant in the case of 
Jerusalem, a city that is geographically and historically an overlay of spaces and artifacts that carry deep 
meaning for competing peoples and nations. The current struggles of Palestinians and Israelis to each claim 
this hallowed ground as their capital city has added yet another layer of complexity, conflict, and political 
division, all of which is reflected in the competing/dual nomenclature Al-Quds/Jerusalem used to refer to 
the  city –as well as the violence and contestation that continues to accelerate unabated. 
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Abstrak 
Kota kelas dunia tidak berjumlah banyak, terkadang disebut ‗kota global‘ atau ‗kota dunia‘. Tidak lebih dari 
selusin wilayah metropolitan di dunia yang mengklaim status sebagai kota global ini. London, New York, Paris, 
dan Tokyo berada di posisi atas hirarki kota di dunia ini. Kota-kota ini memiliki konsentrasi yang sangat besar di 
bidang ekonomi, politik dan budaya -diukur dari beberapa hal seperti jumlah kantor pusat perusahaan, ukuran 
bursa saham, kehadiran badan politik nasional dan internasional, dan peran mereka dalam musik, fesyen, dan 
aktivitas budaya lainnya. Apa yang membuat sebuah kota diklaim oleh dua negara dan menjadi pusat untuk tiga 
agama, tempat dari perbedaan dan keragaman di mana ide-ide bersaing dan warga negara dapat berdampingan 
dengan  cara yang lunak dan kreatif? Konflik keras di Timur Tengah dan siklus kekerasan antara Israel  
dan Palestina sangat tertanam dalam sejarah perjuangan atas kedaulatan nasional dan hak untuk wilayah. 
Untuk alasan ini, pertanyaan tentang negara mana yang berdaulat atas lokasi fisik  telah  menyebabkan 
munculnya konflik dan negosiasi. Hal ini juga berarti bahwa solusi yang paling sering diusulkan untuk 
―permasalahan Timur Tengah‖ berkisar antara persaingan klaim  negara-bangsa, hak keberadaan mereka, dan 
hubungan pengakuan wilayah fisik dan yuridis satu sama lain. Meskipun secara umum benar, bingkai masalah ini 
telah sangat dominan dalam kasus Jerusalem, sebuah kota yang secara geografis dan historis merupakan 
lapisan-lapisan ruang dan artefak yang membawa makna mendalam untuk kedua masyarakat dan bangsa 
yang tengah  bersaing. Arus perjuangan Palestina dan Israel untuk setiap klaim tanah suci ini sebagai ibukota 
mereka telah menambahkan satu lagi lapisan kompleksitas, konflik, dan perpecahan politik,  yang  
semuanya tecermin dalam persaingan dualitas penyebutan Al-Quds/Jerusalem untuk  merujuk  ke kota ini- 
layaknya kekerasan dan kontestasi yang berlanjut sama kerasnya dengan sebelumnya. 
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Introduction 
Still,  we  must  remember  that  as  a   city, 
Jerusalem1     is  also  a  place  in  which  people  
live, work, shop, worship, and play. Far more than 
being merely the contested terrain upon which 
seemingly contradictory  nation-states struggle for 
power, the 
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Figure 1. The City of Jerusalem 
 
What would happen if the contending protago- 
nists in the search for harmony in  Jerusalem 
were compelled to recast their understanding of 
conflicts or tensions, and  possible solutions to 
these prob- lems,  not  in  light  of  questions  about  
competing nations, but in light of questions about 
what  might make Jerusalem a vibrant, democratic, 
and A World Class City? What if they cast their eyes 
towards the types of urban institutions  and built 
environmental patterns that would host a vibrant 
metropolis, rather than  a  political  arrangement  
that  would  sustain some  form  of  state  legitimacy  
and   sovereignty? Rather than always being 
hamstrung by the ―national question‖, might there 
be constructs of urban place and  meaning to be 
imagined that could lead to peace, and by so doing, 
perhaps even help reconcile seemingly intractable 
national claims? 
 
 
Jerusalem History in Brief 
Archaeological findings indicate the  existence 
of a settlement in Jerusalem in the 3rd millennium 
BCE.  The  earliest  written  record  of  the  city  to 
Egyptian records of the Bronze Age (Figure 2). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Ariel view of the Old City of Jerusalem 
 
The city is believed to have been first built and 
founded by Canaanite peoples. During this Canaanite 
period, Jerusalem had the name Urušalim, meaning 
"the city of peace". From  about 1600 to 1300 
BCE, the city came  under  Egyptian suzerainty 
and was governed by Canaanite rulers who paid 
tribute to the Pharaohs. During this period, the city  
increasingly 
 
ancestors of Abraham. Further, the Bible  mentions 
that the city was controlled by the Jebusites until its 
conquest by David, at a date subsequently placed at 
about  1000  BCE.  David  expanded  the  city  to  the 
south, and declared it the capital city of the united 
Kingdom of Israel. It thus became the capital of the 
Jewish kingdoms of Israel, Judah and  Judea in the 
First Temple and Second Temple periods. 
In  about  960  BCE,  Solomon  built  the   First 
Jewish Temple. For about four centuries  after the 
ten tribes split off to form the northern Kingdom of 
Israel,  Jerusalem  served   as  the  capital  of  the 
southern Kingdom of Judah. After 70 years of capti- 
vity, the Jews were allowed by Cyrus II of Persia to 
return to Judah and rebuild the city and the Temple. 
It continued to be the capital of Judah and center of 
Jewish worship for another four centuries under the 
Hasmonean Kingdom. By 19 BCE, the Temple Mount 
was elevated and the Second Temple was expanded 
under Herod the Great,  a Jewish client king under 
Roman rule. In 6  CE, the city and Iudaea 
Province came under  direct Roman rule. The 
Great Jewish Revolt  resulted in the destruction of 
the Second Temple in 70 CE. The city served as 
the  national capital  again  for  almost  3  years  
during  the  Bar Kokhba's revolt against Rome;  it 
was sacked in 135 
CE. For almost two millennia thereafter, Jerusalem 
did  not  serve  as  the  national  capital  of   any 
independent state. 
The city remained under Roman and Byzantine 
rule,  until it was taken by  the  advancing  Muslim 
forces in 638. The rights of  the non-Muslims under 
Islam  were  governed  by  the  Pact  of  Umar4,  and 
Christians and  Jews living in the city were granted 
autonomy  in  exchange  for  a  required  poll   tax. 
Whereas the Byzantine Christian authorities had not 
tolerated the presence of  Jews within the walls of 
the city, the Muslim rulers allowed the reestablish- 
ment of a Jewish community. 
In 1099, the city was conquered by the  First 
Crusaders, who slaughtered most of its  Muslim and 
Jewish inhabitants. A series of  conquests followed: 
in 1187 the city was  taken from the Crusaders 
by Saladin. From 1228 to 1244, it was given by 
Saladin's descendant  al-Kamil  to  the  Holy  Roman  
Emperor Frederick II. Jerusalem fell again to the 
Ayyubids of Egypt in 1244. The Ayyubids were 
replaced in 1260 by the Mamelukes, and  in 1517, 
Jerusalem and its environs fell to the Ottoman 
Turks. 
During the end of the Ottoman Period,  when 
Jerusalem was a key node in the  Islamic imperial 
orbit, there was no strict  correspondence between 
nationality and place  of residence in Jerusalem, a 
situation that created a delicate social and political 
equilibrium among the different peoples in the city - 
but that also prevented extreme  violence. Under a 
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Figure 5. The Church of The Holy Sepulcher 
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than an Islam/Ottoman identity were  governed 
by their  own  laws  and  differentially  represented  
by relevant local consuls in all city matters. 
One of the consequences of this legal arrange- 
ment was that no single  nation-state  was able to 
establish   a   religiously   or   nationalistically-based 
political  monopoly over the territory of Jerusalem 
and  its  inhabitants.  This  rather  unique  situation 
prevented  the  development  of  large  scale  social 
conflict within the city  boundaries, in spite of 
the open antagonism that many groups felt towards 
each other. Yet it also meant that European nations 
would need   to  adopt  other  means  for  imposing  
their imperial claims. One such strategy was to  
establish themselves as ‗protectors‘ of local  non-
citizens, a state  of  affairs  which  sustained  the  
practice  of continuous negotiation within and 
between local and international forces (mainly Great 
Britain,  France, Russia, Germany, Italy/the 
Vatican,  and the Otto- 
man  government).5      These  negotiations   generally 
revolved  around  which  national  state‘s  ―clients‖ 
would be granted rights to occupy particular spaces 
in  the  city  (especially   those  with  primordial  or 
contested religious significance). However, European 
nations also  used Jerusalem‘s ambiguous legal and 
sovereignty status to further justify their  rights 
to intervene on behalf of their preferred clients. 
When  the  Ottoman  Empire  was  not   strong 
enough to fully expulse rival European nations, and 
imperializing  European  nations   themselves  could 
establish full hegemony over Jerusalem, this system 
of clientelis tic representation and negotiation kept 
extremely  violent conflict at bay. However, when 
some of these nations began to feel more militarily 
empowered or challenged, this fragile  diplomatic 
balanced was lost. At the brink of World War I, when 
geopolitical  conditions  on  a  world  scale  became 
unsettled and  precarious, these vying nation-states 
soon  sought to use their control over Jerusalem to 
strengthen  their  position  in  the  global  battle  for 
hegemony. This was especially true with respect to 
Germans   and  their  alliance   with  the   Ottoman 
government, and with British military actions in the 
area  (which  included  the  creation  of  a  detailed 
cartography of the area). The increased imperial and 
transnational  power  of  certain   European  nations 
soon altered the way the space of the city was occu- 
pied. These transformations become most notorious 
in the period when British forces governed Jerusalem 
and imported their planning techniques,  conceived 
in  the  European  framework  of  exclusive  nationa- 
lities. The spatial and ethnical mosaic and mismatch 
which characterized the previous eras was replaced 
by a conscious alignment of people‘s  nationalities 
with specific territorial areas of  Jerusalem. It is 
in precisely  this  moment  that  the  binary  social  
and spatial  understanding of Jerusalem  as being 
com- prised  of  Arab  and  Jewish  populations (the  
same 
 
logic that later sustained the dividing wall) emerged 
– a dynamic outcome that can be traced to purpose- 
ful state planning action by non-resident forces who 
had little concern for the city as such. 
 
 
The Old City of Jerusalem 
Jerusalem  plays  an  important  role  in  three 
major religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, as 
well as in a number of smaller religious groups (Fig- 
ure 3). A large number of places have religious signi- 
ficance for these religions, among which the Temple 
Mount and its Western Wall (Figure 4) for Jews, the 
Church of the Holy Sepulcher (Figure 5) for  Chris- 
tians, and the Al-Aqsa Mosque (Figure 6) and Dome 
of the Rock for Muslims. Currently,  there are 1204 
synagogues, 158 churches (Figure 7), and 73 mosques 
in Jerusalem. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The Map of Jerusalem 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The Western Wall 
 gure 8. The Mapping Area of Jerusalem 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Al-Aqsa Mosque 
 
 
 
Figure 7. One of Church in Jerusalem 
 
 
Judaization of Jerusalem since 1948 and the 
segregation of urban communities 
Destruction in the Old City directly after  the 
1967 saw the demolition of the Maghariba  Quarter 
containing 125 houses for a plaza for  the 
Western Wall. Meanwhile, West Jerusalem was 
cleansed of its Palestinian residents in  the  first 
half of 1948. Its Judaization was secured by the 
forced expulsion of approximately 80,000 
Palestinians from their homes and properties. 
Thirty   eight   Palestinian   villages   in    West 
Jerusalem  were  destroyed  during  the  1948  war. 
Numerous settlements were built  on the ruins 
and occupied lands of these villages. The creation of 
the ―Jewish  Quarter‖  in  the  Old  City  came  from  
the transfer of  Palestinians from their homes and 
from the confiscation of property for the benefit of 
Jews. More settlements sprang up around  
Jerusalem, on land confiscated from the districts 
of Ramallah and Bethlehem. Their presence isolated 
remaining Pales- tinian  neighbourhoods in 
Jerusalem  and formed  a physical outer ring around 
the city. This cuts Palesti- nians in Jerusalem off 
from the rest of Palestine. 
A  policy  of  systematic  and  deliberate  discri- 
mination  against  the  Palestinian   population  was 
developed in Jerusalem through land expropriation, 
planning  permission  and building laws. Like Apart- 
heid  South Africa, the Occupation uses a  racist ID 
card system. In Jerusalem Palestinians hold "tempo- 
rary residency" ID and are subjugated to discrimina- 
tory laws and taxes. Moreover, hundreds of Palesti- 
nians  have  these  IDs  revoked  on  a  yearly  basis, 
reflecting a common tactic used to drive Palestinians 
 
out of the capital. In a rapid amount of  time  the 
Occupation constructed an illegal settlement munici- 
pality of Jerusalem at  odds  with international law 
and the rights of the Palestinian people. Over half of 
the  Occupation municipality today was not part  of 
the city before 1967, but parts of Bethlehem and 28 
other West Bank towns. 
During  the  Oslo  process  new  measures  were 
taken  to  shut  Palestinians  out  of  their   capital. 
Checkpoints were placed on the  entrances to the 
city. Palestinians in Gaza  and the West Bank were 
refused entry. After  the outbreak of the Intifada, 
Palestinians  in  Jerusalem  have  been  forbidden  to 
enter  West  Bank  except  for  Ramallah.  A  steady 
exodus of Palestinian organizations and  commerce 
began from the centre of  Jerusalem into outlying 
areas such as Abu Dis, Ezawiya, Beir Naballa and Al- 
Ram so they could continue to operate. 
 
 
The Apartheid Wall 
Once the wall is finished throughout Jerusalem 
it will total 181 km (Figure 8). By  December 2005, 
over 130 km of the 8-meter high concrete structure 
had been constructed. Completion in early 2006 will 
leave  the  majority  of  Palestinians  in  and  around 
Jerusalem – around 190,000 people - facing two op- 
tions. To stay in Jerusalem‘s ghetto neighborhoods, 
subjected to high Occupation  taxes, imprisoned by 
Walls and a life under  siege. Secondly, exile into 
what remains of  he  West Bank and Gaza or abroad 
and  permanent loss of the right to live in the 
Palestinian capital. Given that Palestinians  rely on 
Jerusalem  for  employment,  basic   services,  and 
education, the Wall is beginning to depopulate these 
villages as well as tearing families and communities 
apart.  In the last few months 80% of the population 
of West Ezawiya village have deserted their homes in 
order to remain in Jerusalem. Out of a population of 
5000  people,  only  around  1000  Palestinians  now 
remain in this village and with the wall‘s completion 
they will be prevented from entering Jerusalem.6 
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The Wall around Jerusalem (Figure 9)  ensures 
the annexation of all the settlement  blocs 
around the city and their expansion on the 
Palestinian lands stolen by the Wall. A chain of 181 
km, the concrete wall forms a series of ghettoized 
Palestinian neigh- borhood  Palestinians are being 
shut in by the Wall and the settler roads into 4 
main ghettos, as follows: 
1.   Northwest  Beit  Duqqu,  Beit  Ijza,  Qibia,  Beit 
Sourik and Beit Anaan will be merged into  one 
ghetto. Occupation Forces have confiscated and 
isolated 14,669 dunums from these villages. The 
North West ghetto  has lost 5 martyrs so far 
in demonstrations against the Apartheid Wall. 
2.   North Beit Hanina, Qalandiya, Beir  Nabala,  al- 
Jeeb and Jodaira form a ghetto. Between them 
the villages will lose at least 10635 dunums from 
the Wall. 
3.   East  where  Ar-Ram,  Jaba',  Hizma,  Anata  and 
Shoffat  form  a  ghetto,  isolated   from  
6500 dunums of their lands. 
4.   Southeast  Abu  Dis,  Anata  and  Eizarya  Ghetto 
where  the  8-meter  high   concrete  wall  runs 
through the school playground sealing off around 
13,000 dunums for Maale Adumim. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. The Apartheid Wall 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Comparating Conflictive Neighbours between 
Israel Wall (above) and Berlin Wall (below) 
 
Two new settler-only bypass roads planned for 
Jerusalem, will add to the grid which already exists 
 
in the city, connecting the settler roads southeast of 
Bethlehem to the roads to the north west. They will 
reach a length of 45 km  for which 1070 dunums of 
land have been confiscated. This road will demolish 
at least 38 houses in Sawahra, Tour and Abu Dis. The 
Second Road (#16) will connect between the Ramot 
Eshkol Settlement to Maale Adumim  and the other 
settlements in East Jerusalem.  The length of the 
road will be 2.8 km (Figure 10). 
 
 
Religious sites 
The  city  hosts  holy  sites  (Figure  11)  for  all 
three monotheistic religions. For  Christians there is 
the   Church   of   the   Holy   Sepulchre.   The   most 
contentious area is what is known to Muslims as the 
Noble Sanctuary (Haram al-Sharif) and to Jews as the 
Temple Mount. A platform of only 35 acres,  it is 
probably the most contested piece of real estate in 
the  world. For Jews  it is the  site of the  second 
Temple. Various fanatical groups such as the Temple 
Mount Faithful have  set up organizations to rebuild 
the temple  and  destroy the Al Aqsa mosque. For 
Muslims, this is where the prophet Muhammad made 
his   miraculous   night   journey   to   heaven.   Huge 
Ramadan congregations  approach 300,000 at Friday 
prayer times.  Jews  pray at the Wailing or Western 
wall. Israel claims to give full access to all to these 
sites but nearly all of the 3.5 million  Palestinians, 
both Muslim and Christian, who live in the Occupied 
Territories are not allowed to visit Jerusalem or pray 
at its holy sites. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. View of religious site in Jerusalem 
 
 
Demographic Changes 
Since  Israel  occupied  the  city  in  1967,  the 
Israeli   government   has   aimed   to   change   the 
de i l  i i  i i 
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order to enlarge the prayer area next to the Wailing 
Wall. 125 Arab houses were  destroyed in the pro- 
cess. Palestinian lands (Figure 12) were confiscated, 
trees uprooted and houses demolished. Settlements 
were built in East Jerusalem on Palestinian land. In 
2003, 217,000 Palestinians share East Jerusalem with 
200,000 Jewish settlers. In the Old city, over  1000 
settlers  have  moved  into  properties  outside  the 
Jewish quarter. 
On 19 April 1999, an inter-ministerial commit- 
tee on Jerusalem recommended  that, in order to 
maintain a 70/30 percent  Jewish majority in 
Jeru- salem, Israel needs  to build 116,000 new 
housing units in the city for Jews by 2020, an annual 
rate of 
5,500, far higher than is currently the case.  
Over half of what we call Jerusalem today was not 
part of the city pre-1967, but were parts of 
Bethlehem and 
28 other West Bank towns. The Israeli  government 
has succeeded in annexing to the city vast areas that 
have nothing to do with historic Jerusalem. 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Child of Palestinian 
 
 
Israeli Settlements 
Since 1967, Israeli governments have  invested 
significant resources in establishing  and expanding 
the settlements in the  Occupied Territories 
(Figure 
13). As a result of this, the Jewish settler population 
in East Jerusalem is now  estimated to be in 
the region of 200,000. The estimated are divided 
into: 
1.   30% (66,500) of the settlers are in the  Greater 
Jerusalem area in Ma‘aleh Adumim, Givat Ze‘ev, 
Betar  Elite,  Har  Adar,  Efrat  and  part  of  the 
Etzion Bloc. 
2.   35%  of  the  land  in  East  Jerusalem  has  been 
expropriated  for  the  construction  of   illegal 
Israeli settlements since 1967. 
3.   The  peace  process  between  Israel  and   the 
Palestinians did not lead to the  evacuation 
of even one settlement, and the settlements 
even grew substantially in area and population 
during this period. 
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Figure 13. The view of 
land use in Jerusalem 
 
 
Discrimination 
Against 
Palestinians 
Since  the  annexation  of  
East  Jerusalem,  the Israeli
 government has
 adopted a
 policy of 
systematic and deliberate 
discrimination against the 
Palestinian  population  in  
Jerusalem  through  land 
expropriation and planning and 
building laws. In July 
2003,   Israel   confiscated   
hundreds   of   acres   of 
Palestinian  land  on  the  West   
Bank  outside  the villages  of  
Beit  Iksa  and   Beit  Souriq,  
north  of Jerusalem for the 
purpose of building settlements 
- in flagrant breach of 
commitments under the US-led 
road map to peace. On 18 August 
2003, Israel issued land
 expropriation orders
 for its
 ‗Jerusalem envelope‘ 
fence in Sur Baher, Sheikh Sa‘ad 
and Abu Dis. Most of the land  
expropriated since 1967 was 
privately owned  by Arabs yet 
over 38,500 housing units  were   
built  on  this  land  for  the  
Jewish population, but not one 
for the Palestinians  Town 
Planning   schemes   were   also   
used   to   restrict development 
of Palestinian neighborhoods, 
limit the area  for  Palestinian   
construction  and  reinforce 
Jewish control throughout the 
city, more describing as follows: 
1.   Palestinian building is only 
allowed in 7% of East 
Jerusalem. 
2.   54%  of  East  Jerusalem  has  been  purposefully 
designated as security areas,  "green areas", or 
Jewish   residential   zones   all   of   which   are 
intended to block Palestinians from building. 
3.   The   housing   shortage   for   the    Palestinian 
population exceeds 20,000 housing units. 
4.   Nearly  a  quarter  of  Palestinian  homes   are 
severely overcrowded. 
5.   In East Jerusalem there are over 43,000 homes 
in  Jewish  neighborhoods  and  only  28,000  in 
Palestinian neighborhoods. Due to  the 
discriminatory town planning laws and the over- 
crowding problems, many  Palestinians have to 
resort to building  ―illegally‖. In doing so, they 
live  with   the  threat  of  having  their  home 
demolished. Both Jews and Palestinians  build 
illegall    i 
equal 
 
 
130 | Journal of Islamic Architecture Volume 1 Issue 3 June 2011 
 
t does not a m to be a ‗so ut on‘ for the  c 
ty, but rather, to prov de  mag nat ve  too s 
wh ch 
 
 
 
c Arch tecture Vo ume 1 ssue 3 June 2011 | 129 
 
6.   During   the   Oslo   process,   the   municipality 
demolished 300 homes in East Jerusalem. 
7.   Palestinians are responsible for less than 20% of 
illegal construction in Jerusalem, yet suffer two 
thirds of the demolition orders. 
 
 
The Politics of Planning 
Israeli planning in Jerusalem is guided  by  the 
objective of maintaining a Jewish  majority in 
the city. While the construction of Jewish 
settlements in East  Jerusalem   expands   the  
Jewish  population, restrictions  on  Palestinian  
development  limit  and reduce the Palestinian 
population. 
 
 
Construction Restrictions 
In 1999 the average Jewish population  density 
was  1  person  per  room,  the  average  Palestinian 
population density 1.8. To meet only existing needs 
many experts believe that an additional 21,000 units 
must be built. The Municipality grants an average of 
150  -  200  permits  a  year  for  Arab  housing  and 
demolishes 25-50 units a year. Between  1967-2001, 
80,800 units were built in Jerusalem for Jews, most 
of them with government subsidies and  44,000 
of them on land expropriated in East Jerusalem. 
Some 
19,900 homes were built for Palestinians.  Only  500 
were subsidized. Some 7,000 are deemed illegal by 
the Municipality. Individual  Palestinian families are 
forced to go through the permit bureaucracy on their 
own   while   in   the   Jewish   sector   experienced 
contractors  apply  for  permits  for  large  blocs  of 
houses at one time.7 
Palestinians are also restricted in the  number 
and size of homes they can build.  Between 
1980- 
1990, 3000 housing units were built in the  
Israeli 
sector per year. Approximately 7000 units were built 
in the Palestinian sector since 1967 or about 350 per 
year.In 1995, 60,000 units  were planned for Jews 
while only 500 for  Palestinians. Palestinian builders 
are  often  limited  to  2  story  housing  units  while 
Jewish housing units have up to 8 stories. 
 
 
Planning Procedures 
Not one new neighborhood for Palestinians has 
been  constructed  in  East  Jerusalem   since  1967. 
There are no comprehensive  planning schemes for 
Palestinian neighborhoods while Spot Zoning reduces 
the  amount  of  land  available  for  development  in 
Palestinian neighborhoods. Palestinians pay  26% of 
municipal  services  cost  but  receive  5%  of  those 
services.  Only  2-12%  of  total  municipal  budget  is 
invested in East Jerusalem infrastructure in Palestinian 
areas.8  ―Green Areas‖ Undeveloped areas are  often  designated  
―green‖  for  public  or  open 
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However, these areas are only
 ―green‖ for 
Palestinians.  In other  words, the 
zone is  ―green‖ until the Israeli 
municipality decides to use the land to  
build  a  new  Jewish  settlement  or  
expand  an existing settlement. S. 
Kaminker, ―East Jerusalem.‖ The Wall 
As is the case throughout the West 
Bank; the  Wall   is  having  dire  effects  
in  Jerusalem‘s Palestinian community. 
Once the Wall is completed, it will 
place severe restrictions on Palestinian 
travel and economic life as it will  
make permanent the restrictions 
enforced  through the closure policy. 
In addition, a network of bypass roads 
will further cut off Palestinian areas 
from each other. According to 
B‘Tselem,  210,000  Palestinian  
residents   of   East Jerusalem. 
The ―Closure‖ – Politics & 
Economics In  March 
1993,  the  Israeli  government  imposed  
a  military ―closure‖ on the West Bank 
and Gaza in response to several attacks 
by Palestinians  on Israelis in West 
Jerusalem. All Palestinians who were 
not Jerusalem residents were barred 
from entering the city unless they 
obtained a  permit. The closure 
severed East Jerusalem from its 
economic hinterland in the West Bank. 
Palestinians consider E. Jerusalem to be 
their social, cultural, economic, 
religious, and  political capital.  The  
severe  damage  to   the  Palestinian 
economy has resulted in higher 
unemployment; some Palestinian 
retailers in  East Jerusalem have 
closed while  others   have   moved  
outside  the  municipal borders of 
Jerusalem. 
 
 
The 
New 
Visi
on 
Future Jerusalem was conceived in 
response to the  deteriorating  situation  
in  the  city  (from  the building of the 
wall to the accelerating and ongoing 
violence) and to the failures of Track I 
and Track II diplomacy, the latter of 
which may partly owe to the great   
inequality in power balances among the 
negotiating  parties.  As  a  strategy  for  
generating peace and understanding, the proposal 
differs from conventional approaches in several 
ways: 
1.   It focuses on the city, not nations, and  in 
so doing emphasizes the uniquely tolerant and 
cos- mopolitan character of the urban 
experience; 
2.   It encourages imagination and vision,  not  the 
real politics of negotiation and  political trade- 
offs; 
3.   It proceeds under the premise that when given 
an opportunity to voice their desires and dreams 
about the city, most citizens - be they Muslims, 
Christians,  or  Jews,   Palestinians  or  Israelis, 
residents or  not  -  are  likely to  find  common 
ground and share similar sentiments about what 
might  make the city of Jerusalem a vibrant, 
peaceful, tolerant and democratic place; 
4.   I i l   i i 
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doubted y offer someth ng d fferent. Just to 
p e the opportun ty to express the r des res 
 
open alternative, innovative ways for discussing 
and eventually dealing with urban and political 
conflict. 
 
 
Methodological Aims and Assumptions 
This proposal is a multi-disciplinary  approach 
because it is certain that the nature of the city, and 
the way out of its conflicts, cannot be reduced to a 
single, negotiated view. In making this claim, we are 
reacting  to  the  ―consensus-building‖  approach  to 
urban policy and problems now predominant in city 
planning practices, in which a shared commitment to 
negotiated problem-solving trumps   all other 
approaches. In the  case of Jerusalem, such 
strate- gies are sometimes part of the problem, 
leading to conflict  over  the  terms  and  
outcomes   (not   to mention perceived
 betrayals) of negotiation. Further, 
given the complex history and character of the  
city,  those involved in  negotiations are more 
often than not selected for their (national) political 
allegiances, not  their urban loyalties, and thus 
do not  fully  represent  the  multiplicity of  actors 
and views existing in the city. Thus, in order to break 
out of   the   stalemate   that   seems  to   have  
further reinforced despair and conflict, and that 
has served to relegate questions of urban livability 
to the back burner of national  political diplomacy, 
we seek to bypass the  standard route of 
negotiation between ―representative‖  peoples  and  
turn  instead  to  the liberating and regenerative 
potential of imagination and vision. Rather than 
aiming for unity or synthesis among the competing  
parties  in their plans for the city‘s future, the 
proposal encourages bold and ‗non- negotiated‘ 
visions of the city, with the assumption that only 
through such processes can we have a good 
understanding of the basic urban conditions on which 
most residents – no matter their religious or ethnic 
identity  –  can  agree  must  be  met. A  second  but 
related ideological pillar of this project is the deep 
belief in design as a more radical -- and at the same 
time  more  subtle  –  mode  of  mediating  or  even 
transcending  urban  conflict.  Following  this  logic, 
then,  we  do  not  work  under  pre-determined  or 
politically  motivated   assumptions  about  national 
sovereignty or ethno-religious power, which then are 
rendered   by  urban  designers  in  the  service  of 
negotiated   political   aims.   Rather,   we   seek   to 
encourage ―non-negotiable‖ views of urban life and 
the city‘s future, both by its  residents and 
others who might also accept Henri Lefebvre‘s notion 
of the ―right to the  city,‖ views which will then 
be given life   and form through the sensitivity of 
urban planning and design. As such, this project 
implies a reversal of the conventional  policymaking 
approach to  urban  conflict,   which  is  often  
mimicked  by designers. Instead of assuming that design serves as the  
technical  realization  of  well-defined  political 
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aims,  we  solicit  the  
production  of  designs  --  or 
visions of the city and its built 
environment -- that will   be   so   
imaginative   and   compelling   
as   to transform or recast 
current political constraints. This 
might be accomplished, for 
example, by using design to re-
align or re-mix the social and 
spatial relations between  
persons or communities  who  in 
the real world of politics have 
found  it necessary to define 
themselves on the basis of binary 
identities (be they Muslim  vs.  
Jewish  or  Palestinian  vs.  
Israeli).  The epistemological  
premise  here  is  that  because  
the city – or the urban built 
environment and the flows of 
persons, activities, and spaces 
that comprise it – lends  itself  
much  less  easily  to  binary  
represen- tation, there are many 
more possibilities for arriving at 
democratically ―subversive‖ or 
socially liberating urban  
arrangements  and   shared  
spaces  through design – 
especially as compared to formal 
politics. As such, a provocative or 
bold new design for the urban 
built environment could be instrumental in producing  a  reframing  of  the  relations   between (binary)  political  actors,  thereby  helping  the  city exist from conflict instead of merely giving form to contested but politically  negotiated accords which 
limit what 
the city 
could be.9 
The  approach  for  
Jerusalem  is  that  it  can 
temporarily de-link10   discussions 
of the future of the city  from  
discussions  of  the  nation  and  
national balances of power, in  
ways that might temporarily 
bracket  some  of  the  larger  
sovereignty  questions that  have   
kept  political  negotiators  and  
urban 
planners alike from being able to 
think about what is best for the 
city and its inhabitants.  This 
can be helpful on several 
counts, the  economic as well as 
the  political  among  them.  
After  all,  it  is  partly because  
national sovereignty concerns 
have over determined   most   of   
the   policy   and   planning 
decisions  for  Jerusalem  that  
the  city  –  and  the metropolitan region more 
generally -- has fallen into startling  economic  
decline.  Jerusalem  is  now  the most impoverished 
and economically distressed city in Israel, in 
addition to being the site of  continual violence  and  
attacks.  Similar  national  sovereignty concerns also 
have played a role in the building of a wall that 
divides not just peoples but open spaces, and that 
shatters the longstanding social and spatial patterns 
of urban life that used to serve as the some of the 
few ways that Palestinians and Israelis would 
encounter each other on a daily  basis: from use of 
markets to labor mobility  to access to basic health 
and welfare institutions. But if people were inspired 
to  think  about the city in its own terms, and  were 
free to imagine what kind  of spatial,  social,  and 
economic practices or  opportunities  would be good 
for  the  entire  city  and  all  its  peoples,  not  just 
particular locations, persons, or neighborhoods, they 
would un l i i 
allow peo l i i i 
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in  this  way  could  lead  to  a  questioning  of  the 
anticipated and unanticipated  consequences of the 
―national‖ logic that is  partly responsible for 
the difficult conditions that now exist. 
 
 
Conclusion 
There is an ample evidence to suggest  
these types of direct negotiations among 
Palestinians and Israelis   are   extremely   difficult   
to   mount   and manage, at least at the level of the 
city as a whole, and that  consensus is often quite 
elusive. It took years for the contending parties to 
agree on the Oslo Accords  (and  more  recently  the  
Geneva  Accords were almost as difficult), and here 
we are, decades into such experiments, with both 
urban and political conditions in Jerusalem looking 
more treacherous as time goes on. Moreover, some 
have argued that such representative but managed 
negotiations are often a part  of  the  problem,  
because  they  raise  difficult questions  about  who  
is  entitled  to  represent  an entire group of  
people in a negotiation about their future. There 
also are questions about whether this process  really  
works  well  when  there  are  serious historical   and   
contemporary   power   imbalances 
between  the  players.11     For  precisely  this  
reason, 
some  even  have  argued  that  the  2nd   Intifada 
emerged  out  of  citizen   dissatisfaction  with  the 
leadership involved  in  the Oslo Accords, as well as 
resentment towards these leaders for being 
compelled  to  negotiate  away  or  compromise  on 
conditions in the city that  residents felt should 
be non-negotiable. 
The purpose is to break out of the impasses of 
the past, not to yield yet another mirror reflection 
of the sorry and highly polarized state of Palestinian- 
Israeli political relations,  or yet another round of 
subtle diplomatic  intricacies. One way to do this 
is to reject the a priori designation of participants 
only on the base of a binary Palestinian or Israeli 
identity, something  that  has  been  all  but  
required  in  the participatory,  negotiation,  and   
consensus-building strategies  for  this  part   of   
the  world.  Such  an approach has not  only 
served to reinforce a pre- conceived, essentialist 
separation of actors into two distinct camps, 
thereby making it even  harder  for individual  
participants  to  find  possible  venues  of 
collaboration or common interests. Negotiations con- 
ducted under this pattern of binary (i.e. Palestinian 
vs. Israeli or  Jewish vs. Muslim) identification 
are also  hampered by problems of legitimacy, since 
leadership  cannot  genuinely  represent  their  sup- 
posed constituencies. And again, the  inequality of 
power resources between these  groups harms the 
validity of the negotiations in themselves. 
Third, we are committed to thinking about the city as the 
object of discussion and transformation, 
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(neighborhood or community on the one 
hand, or the nation, on the other). In 
fact, we hope that assessing conditions 
and developing a  project for this 
inter- mediate scale in itself  will 
constitute some sort of analytical –not 
to mention procedural– breakthrough in  
producing  new  paths  for  peace  in  
the  region. However, when the city is 
the subject of study and action,  it  
must  be  recognized   to  be  a  
multi- disciplinary unit whose future 
cannot be determined only through 
political negotiation, and only through 
the involvement of folks whose 
identities are set on the  basis  of  
religion  or  ethnicity.   Indeed,  why 
wouldn‘t we invited negotiation  
―partners‖ on the basis of economic 
function,  or spatial location, or any 
other relevant ―urban‖ identity that is 
meaning- ful in the life of a city‘s 
inhabitants? The idea that a political  
consensus would be ‗naturally‘ 
translated into  the spatial 
arrangement of the city  reveals a 
deep misunderstanding of the  
inherently contested nature of urban 
spaces. Material configurations have 
their  own  norms  beyond  any  policy  
imposed  on them. Also, the city is not 
an abstract space which can be 
manipulated to follow a political 
project, but there is an inherent ―urban‖ resistance to transformations. 
Last these proposed solutions can  
themselves be used at later stages for 
discussion, deliberation, and 
development of consensus about what is 
needed to enable either the particular 
vision or its implicit social  justice 
aims. That is why we are  hoping to 
solicit multiple visions, rather than  
thinking about what   it   would   take   
to   get   a   multiplicity   of fragmented 
and  competing forces (split within and 
between the two ―sides‖) to actually 
negotiate and agree on just one view. 
The visions that is expected to   
generate   are   not   likely   to   be   
restrained approaches  conjured  up  in  
light  of  what  is  only possible now 
given the  real politics of the current 
situation. Rather, they are bound to be 
idealistic if not daring conceptions of 
what a vibrant, peaceful, and  
democratic Jerusalem would look like.  
Rather than   shying   away   from   
prescriptive,   idealistic statements.  It  
sees  the  value  of  offering  utopian visions  for   
Jerusalem  as  one  way  of  enabling protagonists to 
think ―outside the box,‖  with  the expectation 
that such an exercise will help produce new or 
innovative options  for the city which may have 
been overlooked  because of prior constraints on 
framing the problem of negotiating the solution. 
Then we  work ―backwards‖ from these visions to 
understand and address the political  constraints on 
getting there. By so doing, we  hope to reverse the 
conventional  teleology  and  prevailing  practice  as 
applied to the  city, in which political negotiations 
always take priority, with designs or plans always the 
outcome of politically acceptable ‗solutions‘  rather 
th i i i 
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Figure 14. Part of Jerusalem 
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